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Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) have emerged as a promising technique to rapidly provide wireless services to a group of
mobile users simultaneously. The paper aims to address a challenging issue that each user is selfish and may misreport his location or
preference for changing the optimal UAV location to be close to himself. Using algorithmic game theory, we study how to determine the
final location of a UAV in the 3D space, by ensuring all selfish users’ truthfulness in reporting their locations for learning purpose. To
minimize the social service cost in this UAV placement game, we design strategyproof mechanisms with the approximation ratios,
when comparing to the social optimum. We also study the obnoxious UAV placement game to maximally keep their social utility, where
each incumbent user may misreport his location to keep the UAV away from him. Moreover, we present the dual-preference UAV
placement game by considering the coexistence of the two groups of users above, where users can misreport both their locations and
preference types (favorable or obnoxious) towards the UAV. Finally, we extend the three games above to include multiple UAVs and
design strategyproof mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.
Index Terms—Algorithmic game theory, approximation ratio, strategyproof mechanism, unmanned aerial vehicle.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
F UTURE development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)expects each UAV to be intelligent enough to learn and
operate independently without intervention of human controllers.
As a hot topic of artificial intelligence, algorithmic game theory
helps design such a UAV to strategically interact with its potential
customers in the first place and learn their private information
before flying to provide customized services [2]. Recently, in the
field of wireless communications, the use of UAVs as flying cell
sites becomes a promising technique to solve the coverage prob-
lem of territorial wireless networks [3]. Traditional base stations
are deployed at fixed locations on the ground for a long term by
catering to the average traffic load in the two-dimensional ground
area, while flying UAVs do not have such constraint in space or
time for deployment. Owing to their agility and mobility, UAVs
can be quickly deployed as alternatives to meet time-varying traffic
load. Major wireless carriers such as AT&T started to use UAVs
to opportunistically boost wireless coverage for crowds in big
concerts and sports, where people request good wireless services
to continuously post their selfies and videos online [4]. Moreover,
UAVs can be rapidly deployed in events of disasters to enable
air-to-ground communications when territorial base stations fail to
work. Verizon launched an exercise in mid 2017 to deploy UAVs
to Cape May, New Jersey, and provide emergency crews facing
hurricane disaster with airborne 4G LTE connectivity [5].
To fully reap the benefits of UAV-provided wireless services,
one must determine the final UAV hovering location to best serve
a group of target users in the two-dimensional (2D) geographical
ground. As the number of UAVs is small compared to the target
user size, the final UAV position needs to balance all target
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users’ different locations and preferences to optimize their social
benefit. Such a problem has been recently investigated in the
literature by assuming that the UAV knows the real locations or
at least the distribution of mobile users upon deployment (e.g.,
[6], [7], [8], [9], [10]). For example, [6] aimed to maximize the
UAV’s wireless coverage on the ground, by considering the air-
to-ground signal propagation feature. [7] improved the energy-
efficiency of UAV communication with ground users by designing
the UAV’s trajectory. [8] studied how to minimize the delay
of deploying UAVs till providing the full wireless coverage in
the worst scenario. [9] studied the cooperation among intelligent
vehicles in term of link scheduling. [10] further studied how a
UAV should allocate and price its limited capacity for serving a
group of users on the way, by assuming public user arrival and
preference distributions. Unlike these works, we aim to study the
optimal UAV placement without knowing any user’s location or
distribution information beforehand, by strategically learning from
the selfish users themselves.
In practice, it is difficult for a UAV to track users’ locations
in real time, and traditional user positioning techniques require
multiple base stations’ continuous help [11], [12]. When requiring
a UAV’s help, however, ground network infrastructure is often
congested and may even fail to work, which makes it difficult
for a UAV to self-track users’ locations upon deployment [13]. It
is more desirable for the UAV to directly interact with users for
learning their own locations for the optimal deployment. Though
appealing, this approach is vulnerable given many users in practice
are selfish and may misreport their private information. Selfish
users only care about their own service benefits and prefer the
closest UAV location to themselves. They may not report their true
locations to help determine the optimal UAV placement for best
serving the crowd. Consider an illustrative uplink communication
example where we deploy a UAV to a hovering point on a line
interval [0, 4] for serving user 1 at location x1 = 0 and user 2
at location x2 = 2 simultaneously. Each user prefers the final
UAV location to be as close to his own location as possible to
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2obtain high signal-to-noise-ratio or save his transmission power.
If the two users report their locations truthfully, the UAV chooses
to locate at the mean of the two users’ locations (i.e., optimal
UAV location x = 1). However, if user 2 misreports his location
from x2 = 2 to x′2 = 4, then mean UAV location changes to
x = 2 which is the closest to user 2. For optimizing the wireless
service provision, in this paper, we use algorithmic game theory to
investigate how the UAV should interact strategically with selfish
users and learn their true locations and preferences.
Besides the favorable UAV placement game, we also study
the obnoxious UAV placement game. As the new UAV facility
may interfere with another group of incumbent (adverse) users
in the same space, we want to best control the interference
and maximally keep these users’ social utility when the UAV
determines its placement position. In this game, the UAV also
requires all such users to report their locations for determining
the UAV location, where a user may misreport his location to
mislead the final UAV location to be further away from his true
location and reduce interference from the UAV. Moreover, as both
the UAV’s facility users (who prefer to be close to the UAV) and
adverse users (who prefer to be far away from the UAV) may
coexist at the same time, we want to reach a good balance between
the positive and negative effects on the two diverse user groups
when locating the UAV in the dual-preference UAV placement
game. We still require strategyproof (truthful) mechanism design
for the strategic UAV’s learning interaction with selfish users to
ensure all users’ truthfulness in reporting their locations and even
preference types.
The paper’s key novelty and main contributions are summa-
rized as follows.
• Novel UAV placement games for strategic learning of
users’ private information: To our best knowledge, our
paper is the first to propose and analyze UAV placement
games through strategically learning selfish users’ loca-
tions and service preferences. We consider a challenging
scenario where mobile users can purposely hide their
current locations and preferences from the UAV. Using
algorithmic game theory, we completely study a UAV
placement game for serving facility users, an obnoxious
UAV placement game for protecting adverse users, and a
dual-preference UAV placement game for handling both
groups of users, where users are selfish and may misreport
their locations to mislead the UAV placement. We aim to
design strategyproof mechanisms with provable approxi-
mation ratios in these three games to ensure users’ truthful
location reporting and optimize the social cost or utility.
• Mechanism design for the UAV placement game: In
Section 3, we propose two strategyproof mechanisms
such that any user’s misreporting of his locations can
only increase his service cost. Especially, we design the
weighted median strategyproof mechanism for the strate-
gic UAV-user learning interaction. with approximation
ratio 2(3α−4)/2, when comparing to the social optimal
cost. This worst-case result is robust no matter which
distribution users’ locations follow. Besides the worst-
case analysis of the proposed strategyproof mechanisms,
we also analyze the empirical performances of the two
mechanisms and prove that they converge to the social
optimum as the number of users becomes large, given
users’ locations following any symmetric distributions.
• Mechanism design for the obnoxious UAV placement
game: In Section 4, we consider the opposite problem
of locating an obnoxious UAV. Each (adverse) user now
attempts to stay far away from the UAV to reduce its
received interference, by misreporting his location. Our
target is to design a strategyproof mechanism for the
UAV placement and maximally keep the social utility
of such users. Accordingly, we design a strategyproof
mechanism with approximation ratio 5 × 2(α−2)/2. Our
empirical analysis further shows that the proposed mech-
anism converges to the social optimum as the number
of users becomes large, given users’ locations following
asymmetric distributions.
• Mechanism design for the dual-preference UAV placement
game: In Section 5, we study the more general case of
the dual-preference UAV placement game by considering
the co-existence of both facility users and adverse users.
Besides locations, we further allow users to misreport
their preference types (i.e., favorable or obnoxious) in the
strategic UAV-user interaction. We design a strategyproof
mechanism with approximation ratio 23α/2 and validate
the empirical result that it converges to the social opti-
mum as the number of users becomes large, given users’
locations following any asymmetric distributions and the
number of adverse users is larger than the number of
facility users.
• Mechanism design for multi-UAV placement game: In
Section 6, we extend our three UAV placement games in
Sections 3-5 by including more than one UAV. In the dual-
preference placement game with two UAVs, we further
allow each user to have diverse and hidden preferences
over different UAVs and design a strategyproof mechanism
with approximation ratio When there is an arbitrary num-
ber k of UAVs to deploy, we also extend our mechanism
design in the favorable and obnoxious placement games.
The organization of the paper is shown as follows. In Section 2,
we describe the mathematical models of one-UAV placement and
obnoxious one-UAV placement game; in Section 3 of one-UAV
placement game, we propose strategyproof Mechanisms 1 and 2
and analyze the empirical performances of them; in Section 4 of
obnoxious one-UAV placement game, we propose strategyproof
Mechanisms 3 and 4; in Section 5 of dual-preference UAV place-
ment game, we propose strategyproof Mechanism 5; in Section
6 of multiple-UAV placement game, we propose strategyproof
Mechanisms 6 and 7.
1.1 Related work
In the research of algorithmic game theory, there are some
studies on the generic facility location game and strategyproof
mechanisms to prevent users from misreporting locations. Such
mechanisms are simply based on users’ location reports and are
easy to implement, without using complicated schemes such as
location-based pricing and billing. For example, [14] proposed
median strategyproof mechanisms with provable approximation
ratios on a one-dimensional line, which gives us some inspiration
of proposing our strategyproof mechanisms in the UAV placement
game. In the obnoxious facility location game, the mechanism
design for the objective of maximizing total users’ utility was
first studied by [15]. [16] characterized strategyproof mechanisms
with exactly two candidates in the general metric and showed that
3Fig. 1: System model about a UAV’s placement in the 3D space.
There are generally two types of users with dual preferences:
type 1 (users of the UAV facility) and type 2 (adverse users
experiencing UAV’s interference). In the UAV placement game
in Section 3, all users are of type 1; in the obnoxious UAV
placement game in Section 4, all users are of type 2; and in the
dual-preference UAV placement game in Section 5, both types of
users coexist.
there exists a lower bound 3 of strategyproof mechanism. [17] and
[18] investigated the properties of the one facility location game
with dual-preference. [19] showed mechanism design problem for
users over multi-dimensional domains when multiple facilities can
be chosen.
Such works focus on one facility placement in one-dimension,
while the real UAV placement is in 3D and may include more than
one UAV facility. Further, our paper models users’ heterogeneity
in their service sensitivities (weights) and the line-of-sight air-
to-ground propagation in wireless communications. Such unique
wireless feature and user heterogeneity translate to a new problem
objective and require new methods in designing the strategyproof
mechanisms and proving approximation ratios.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of users that are located in
the 2D space I2. Without loss of generality, we suppose I2 is a
finite rectangle [0, 2A]× [0, 2B] containing all n users as shown
in Fig.1. The real location of user i ∈ N is (xi, yi) ∈ I2.
We denote x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) and y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) as
users’ location profiles in the 2D space. Depending on the users’
locations, the single UAV’s location is denoted as point (x, y, z0),
which is in 3D space. 1 z0 satisfies z0 ∈ [0,∞) and is a fixed
number determined by the UAV. The distance between user i and
the UAV is
√
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20 .
We first introduce the UAV placement game, where each user
(of type 1 in Fig.1) prefers the UAV location to be close to his own
location for saving his service cost. Similar to [20], we model air-
to-ground link for the suburban scenarios by using Rician fading
with κ factor, where κ is the ratio between the energy in the
line-of-sight (LoS) component and the energy in the multi-path
component. Note that Rician fading is an adequate choice which
1. We will extend all solutions to include more than one UAV in Section 6.
consists of an LoS component and a large number of i.i.d. reflected
and scattered waves. Similar to [6], we also fix UAV altitude as z0
to best trade off between LOS links and signal attenuation. Then
we generally model the coordinate of the UAV in 3D as (x, y, z0)
and the coordinate of ground user i in 2D as (xi, yi), respectively.
We thus model the instantaneous communication channel
between the UAV and each user i as a product of a large-scale
path loss component and a small-scale fading component, i.e.,
gi = |ψi|2θ[
√
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20/d]−α,
where ψi is the small-scale fading gain of the channel between
the UAV and user i, α ∈ [2, 6] is the path-loss exponent, and
θ(dB) = −20 log10(4pid/ν) denotes the channel power at the
reference distance of d with wavelength ν. We adopt d = 1 meter
throughout the paper and assume the additive white Gaussian noise
has zero mean and variance σ2.We consider the small-scale fading
gain ψi follows Rician fading ψi =
√
κ
1+κψL+
√
1
1+κψM [21],
where κ is the ratio between the energy in the LoS component
and the energy in the multi-path component, ψL is a normalized
constant representing the LoS component and ψM is the circular
symmetric complex Guassian random variable with zero mean and
unit variance. Denote the transmit power by user i as ci. The
instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for user i’s signal at the
UAV receiver is given by
SNRi =
cigi
σ2
=
ci|ψi|2θ
((x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2σ2
.
After determining the location of the UAV and user i, the in-
stantaneous success probability under small-scale fading is given
by Pr(SNRi ≥ SNRi,th), where SNRi,th is the instantaneous
SNR threshold for supporting user i’s application. To ensure
this probability is sufficiently large, we have the condition of
Pr(SNRi ≥ SNRi,th) ≥ 1 −  and rewrite it as SNRi ≥ SNRi,th,
where SNRi,th is a function of SNRi,th and , and SNRi is the
average SNR give by,
SNRi =
ciIE[gi]
σ2
=
ciIE[|ψi|2]θ
((x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2σ2
.
=
ciθ
((x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2σ2
≥ SNRi,th.
For ease of reading, we denote the weight of user i as wi =
SNRi,thσ
2/θ, and expect the minimum the service cost ci =
SNRi,thσ
2((x − xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2/θ = wi((x −
xi)
2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2 in term of power consumption. Here,
weight wi > 0 models user i’s sensitivity and he prefers the
UAV to be closely located for his cost saving. If a user has a
larger weight as compared to the other users, the UAV should
be located closer to him. We denote wi as user i’s weight and
w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) as weight profile. In practice, each user
i’s weight wi can be estimated by the UAV from identifying
the specific traffic application type, and is public information. 2
However, the UAV does not know the users’ location profiles x
and y. We denote Ω = {x, y|w} as the full user profile. The UAV’s
objective is to minimize the sum of weighted costs by strategically
choosing (x, y, z0) based on users’ location reports.
In the UAV placement game, a mechanism outputs a UAV
location (x, y, z0) based on a given profile Ω and thus is a function
2. Actually, some of our mechanisms (e.g., Mechanisms 1 and 4) designed
later also handles the case without knowing wi.
4f : I2n → I2, i.e., (x, y) = f(x, y). As explained, the cost of
user i is given by
ci(f(x, y), (xi, yi)) =wi((xi− x)2 + (yi− y)2 + z20)α/2. (1)
Let x−i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn) and y−i = (y1, · · · ,
yi−1, yi+1, · · · , yn) denote the location profiles for all n users
except user i. The social cost of a mechanism f is defined as the
sum of all users’ costs, i.e.,
SC(f(x, y), (x, y)) =
n∑
i=1
ci(f(x, y), (xi, yi)). (2)
In the following, we formally define the strategyproofness for
mechanism design in the UAV placement game, which is robust
against any distributions of users’ locations.
Definition 1. A mechanism is strategyproof in the UAV placement
game if no user can benefit from misreporting his location. For-
mally, given profile Ω = (< xi, x−i >,< yi, y−i > |w) ∈ I2n,
and any misreported location (x′i, y
′
i) ∈ I2 for any user i ∈ N , it
holds that
ci(f((xi, yi), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi))
≤ci(f((x′i, y′i), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi)).
For the UAV placement game, we are interested in designing
strategyproof mechanisms that perform well with respect to mini-
mizing the social cost. Given a location profile Ω, let OPT1(x, y)
be the optimal social cost in (2). A strategyproof mechanism f
has an approximation ratio γ ≥ 1, if for any location profile
(x, y) ∈ I2n, γOPT1(x, y) ≥ SC(f, (x, y)). γ tells us the
worst-case performance of f no matter which distributions the
users’ locations follow, and we prefer f with a small γ.
On the other hand, in the obnoxious UAV placement game, the
UAV faces a different group of n adverse users (of type 2 in Fig.1)
and introduces downlink interference to them. They prefer to be
far away from the UAV and their (positive) weights wi’s here tell
their different interference sensitivities in their traffic applications.
We define adverse user i’s utility ui = wid((xi, yi), (x, y, z0))2
under interference, which is the same as (1). ui nonlinearly
increases with the distance from the UAV. Opposite to the UAV
placement game, the UAV’s objective in this game is to maximize
the sum of users’ weighted utilities, by designing strategyproof
mechanisms f(x, y, z0) for learning users’ truthful locations. The
social utility of a mechanism f is defined as:
SU(f(x, y), (x, y)) =
n∑
i=1
ui(f(x, y), (xi, yi)). (3)
Next, we formally define the strategyproofness for the obnox-
ious UAV placement game.
Definition 2. A mechanism is strategyproof in the obnoxious UAV
placement game if no adverse user can benefit from misreport-
ing his location. Formally, given profile Ω = (< xi, x−i >
,< yi, y−i, yi > |w) ∈ I2n, and any misreported location
(x′i, y
′
i) ∈ I2 for user i, it holds that
ui(f((xi, yi), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi))
≥ui(f((x′i, y′i), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi)).
For the obnoxious UAV placement game, we are interested
in designing strategyproof mechanisms that perform well with
respect to maximizing the social utility in (3). Given a location
profile Ω, let OPT2(x, y) be the optimal social utility. A strate-
gyproof mechanism f has an approximation ratio γ ≥ 1, if for
any location profile (x, y) ∈ I2n, OPT2(x, y) ≤ γSU(f, (x, y)).
We will introduce the model of the dual-preference UAV
placement game in Section 5, by combining the two games as
defined above. In Section 6, we will further extend the three multi-
UAV placement games above by including multiple UAVs for new
strategyproof mechanisms.
3 UAV PLACEMENT GAME FOR TYPE 1 USERS
In this section, we design strategyproof mechanisms for the UAV
placement game where all n users are of preference type 1.
According to (1) and (2), we have the following social cost
SC(f, (x, y)) =
n∑
i=1
wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2,
which is a convex function with respect to (x, y). The optimization
problem of this game is formulated as
minf
∑n
i=1 wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2,
s.t. for any misreported location (x′i, y
′
i)∈I2 and user i∈N ,
ci(f((xi, yi), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi))
≤ ci(f((x′i, y′i), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi)).
Variable: function f(x, y) = (x, y) : I2n → I2.
Parameters:(xi, yi) ∈ I2, wi > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n, z0 ≥ 0
and α ∈ [2, 6].
For α = 2, by checking the first-order conditions, we obtain the
weighted mean (x, y, z0) = (x¯, y¯, z0) as the optimal location,
where
x¯ =
∑n
i=1 wixi∑n
i=1 wi
and y¯ =
∑n
i=1 wiyi∑n
i=1 wi
. (4)
However, this weighted mean mechanism is not strategyproof as
we explained in the illustrative example in Section 1.
3.1 Design and Analysis of strategyproof mechanisms
In the following, we present two strategyproof mechanisms with
provable approximation ratios.
Mechanism 1. Given a profile Ω, return median location
(x, y, z0) = med(x, y, z0) = (xmed, ymed, z0) as the UAV
location, where xmed is the median of x, 3 and ymed is the median
of y.
Theorem 1. Define wmax = max {w1, . . . , wn} and wmin =
min {w1, . . . , wn}. Mechanism 1 is strategyproof for α ∈ [2, 6].
and has the approximation ratio γ = wmaxwmin 2
(3α−4)/2 for α ≥ 2
as compared to the social optimum.
Proof. First we prove Mechanism 1 is a strategyproof mechanism.
Assume x1 ≤ x2 · · · ≤ xn without loss of generality, and x-
location of UAV xmed is xj (i.e., x = xmed = xj). If user i
(i ≤ j) chooses to misreport his x location, we have two cases: (i)
The misreported x-value is smaller than the original x-value xj
and the x-value of the new UAV location (i.e., x) will not change;
(ii) The misreported x-value is greater than the original x-value
xj and the x-value of the new UAV location (i.e., x) will not be
3. If n is even, we choose the (n
2
)-th smallest value of x profile as xmed.
This location strategy is the same for location profiles y and z.
5smaller than xj . However, (xi − x)2 will not decrease and thus
his cost wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2 will not decrease.
Therefore, user i cannot decrease his cost by misreporting his xi.
Similarly, he cannot decrease his cost by misreporting his yi in the
other independent domain of the 2D space. Similar results hold for
i > j due to symmetry. Next, we prove the approximation ratio γ.
To obtain the approximation ratio, we need to let z0 = 0 first.
By Lemmas 1 and 2 in Appendix, we have
γ =
∑n
i=1 wi((xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2)α/2
minx,y
∑n
i=1 wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2)α/2
≤ wmax
wmin
∑n
i=1((xi − xmed)2 + (yi − ymed)2)α/2
minx,y
∑n
i=1((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2)α/2
≤ wmax
wmin
∑n
i=1 2
α/2−1((xi − xmed)α + (yi − ymed)α)
minx,y
∑n
i=1((xi − x)α + (yi − y)α)
=
wmax
wmin
2α/2−1
∑n
i=1(xi − xmed)α
minx
∑n
i=1(xi − x)α
≤ wmax
wmin
2α/2−12α−1 =
wmax
wmin
2(3α−4)/2. (5)
Mechanism 1 treats each user equally and does not consider
users’ weights. If users have diverse weights such that wmaxwmin is
large, the approximation ratio γ is large. It should be noted that
Mechanism 1 also has its merit: since the UAV does not need to
gather the information of weights from users, it is strategyproof
even if we allow users to misreport their weights. Next, we propose
a better mechanism to achieve a much smaller approximation ratio.
Mechanism 2. Consider x-domain first, we re-
order {x1, x2, . . . , xn} as {xj1 , xj2 , . . . , xjn} with
xj1 ≤ xj2 ≤ · · · ≤ xjn . Define xwmed as a particular
xjq , where integer q satisfies
∑
i≤q wji ≥
∑
i>q wji and∑
i<q wji <
∑
i≥q wji . In y-domain, ywmed follows the same
structure. Given a profile Ω, the UAV adopts weighted median
wmed(x, y, z0) = (xwmed, ywmed, z0) for its location.
Theorem 2. Mechanism 2 is strategyproof for α ∈ [2, 6] and has
the approximation ratio γ = 2(3α−4)/2 for α ≥ 2.
Proof. First, we can use the similar analysis in Theorem 1 to prove
that Mechanism 2 is strategyproof for α ∈ [2, 6]. Now we prove
the approximation ratio for d ≥ 2. Without loss of generality,
we rescale each wi uniformly as positive integer in this proof.
By partitioning user i into a number wi of small users with unit
weight 1, we obtain new sequenced sets of profile x and y :
{xj1 , . . . , xj1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wj1
, xj2 , . . . , xj2︸ ︷︷ ︸
wj2
, . . . , xjn , . . . , xjn︸ ︷︷ ︸
wjn
},
{yj1 , . . . , yj1︸ ︷︷ ︸
wj1
, yj2 , . . . , yj2︸ ︷︷ ︸
wj2
, . . . , yjn , . . . , yjn︸ ︷︷ ︸
wjn
}. (6)
Then we rewrite SC(f, (x, y)) ≤ γOPT1(x, y) as
n∑
i=1
((xji − xwmed)2 + (yji − ywmed)2)α/2 + . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
wji
)
≤γmin
x,y
n∑
i=1
((xji − x)2 + (yji − y)2)α/2 + . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
wji
) (7)
Note that xwmed is the median in set (6) and ywmed is the median
in set (6). According to the similar proof in (5), we can prove in
(7), γ = 2(3α−4)/2.
Comparing Mechanisms 1 and 2, we can see that Mecha-
nism 2 takes users’ heterogeneous weights into account for the
mechanism design and achieves better worst-case performance.
Besides the worst-case analysis, we will show in Subsection 3.2
that these two mechanisms perform analogously in average sense
to approach the social optimum. The complexity of the proposed
two mechanisms should be O(n). Such complexity is low and
can return solution quickly. The computation complexities of the
following Mechanisms 3-5 are linear in the user number n and
thus in the order also are O(n).
3.2 Empirical analysis of Mechanisms 1 and 2
So far we have only analyzed the worst-case performances of the
two mechanisms in term of approximation ratio. In this subsection,
we present empirical analysis to further evaluate the average
performances of the mechanisms for α = 2. In Mechanism
1, we choose median location as the UAV location and we
define the social cost ratio by comparing to the social optimum:
Ratio.1 = SC(med(x,y,z0),(x,y))OPT1(x,y) . In Mechanism 2, we choose
weighted median location as the UAV location and we define the
social cost ratio: Ratio.2 = SC(wmed(x,y,z0),(x,y))OPT1(x,y) . Note that
Ratio.1 and Ratio.2 are random variables, depending on distri-
butions of x, y and z, while approximation ratio γ characterizes
the maximum of each ratio in the worst-case.
Theorem 3. For α = 2, as the number n of users goes to infinity,
both Ratio.1 and Ratio.2 converge in probability towards 1,
given all xi’s, yi’s, zi’s and wi’s are independent and identically
distributed, respectively, and all xi’s, yi’s and zi’s follow any
continuous symmetric distributions (including normal, uniform
and logistic distributions), respectively.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix. Theorem 3
prove that the two mechanisms perform optimally when n is
sufficiently large. We next provide more simulations for evalu-
ating Mechanisms 1 and 2. For simplicity, we assume α = 2,
z0 = 0.2 and I2 = [0, 1]2, where each user’s location follows
the continuous uniform distribution in I2 and each wi follows the
continuous uniform distribution in [0, 1].
Fig.2(a) shows that the two mean social costs under Mech-
anisms 1 and 2 as well as the mean optimal social cost increase
linearly as the number of users increases. No matter which number
of users we are looking at, the performance gaps between the
mean optimal social cost and the mean social costs achieved by
Mechanism 1 and 2 are quite small, which means our Mechanisms
1 and 2 approximate well the optimal solution in average sense.
Fig.2(b) shows that the mean two random ratios decrease to
1 as the number of users increases. Consistent with our prior
worst-case conclusion, Fig.2(b) also shows that in the average-
case Mechanism 2 outperforms Mechanism 1, as the mean of
Ratio.2 is smaller than the mean of Ratio.1 given any number
of users. Yet such advantage is no longer obvious once n > 10.
Interestingly, from Fig.2(b) we can observe that Ratio.1 at odd
number n (n = 2m − 1 with natural number m) of user size is
smaller than Ratio.1 at neighboring even number n (n = 2m).
This is because if n is odd, med(x, y, z0) can be relatively closer
to (x¯, y¯, z0), as compared to the case that n is even.
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Fig. 2: Simulations for comparing the social costs under Mecha-
nisms 1 and 2 with the optimal social cost.
4 OBNOXIOUS UAV PLACEMENT GAME FOR TYPE
2 USERS
In this section, we study strategyproof mechanism design for the
obnoxious UAV placement game, where all n users of type 2 in
Fig.1 view the UAV obnoxious due to its introduced interference
and want to be far away from the UAV. The optimization problem
of this game is formulated as
maxf
∑n
i=1 wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2,
s.t. for any misreported location (x′i, y
′
i)∈I2 and user i∈N ,
ui(f((xi, yi), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi))
≥ ui(f((x′i, y′i), (x−i, y−i)), (xi, yi)).
Variable: function f(x, y) = (x, y) : I2n → I2.
Parameters:(xi, yi) ∈ I2, wi > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n, z0 ≥ 0,
and α ∈ [2, 6].
4.1 Design and analysis of strategyproof mechanism
We first analyze the optimal UAV location under full information
as the benchmark. We obtain that
∂SU(x, y)
∂x
=
n∑
i=1
αwi(x−xi)((x−xi)2+ (y−yi)2+ z20)
α−2
2 ,
∂2SU(x, y)
∂x2
=
n∑
i=1
αwi(((x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2−1
+ (α− 2)((x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 + z20)α/2−2(x− xi)2) ≥ 0,
and similarly, ∂
2SU(x,y)
∂y2 ≥ 0. Thus SU((x, y), (x, y)) is convex
in (x, y) ∈ I2. The optimal (maximum) solution should lie in
boundary of I2, which are the corners of rectangle I2. We obtain
the optimal UAV location is x = 0 or 2A and y = 0 or 2B.
This optimal solution is not strategyproof by considering an
illustrative example in 1D: given α = 2, there are user 1 at x1 =
0.2 and user 2 at x2 = 0.6 in domain 1D I = [0, 1], where user 2
can misreport his location to x′2 = 1 to keep the UAV away from
him at x = 0. Next, we design strategyproof mechanisms.
Mechanism 3. The UAV strategically decides its location f =
(x, y, z0), where
x =
{
0, if
∑
i:xi∈[0,A) wi ≤
∑
i:xi∈[A,2A] wi;
2A, otherwise,
y =
{
0, if
∑
i:yi∈[0,B) wi ≤
∑
i:yi∈[B,2B] wi;
2B, otherwise.
(8)
In Mechanism 3, The UAV compares the total user weights
in regimes [0, A) and [A, 2A] of the x-domain, and places the
obnoxious UAV at the corner with the smaller total weight. Sim-
ilarly, The UAV places its location in y-domain for the weighted
majority’s benefit.
Theorem 4. Mechanism 3 is a strategyproof mechanism with
approximation ratio γ = 5 × 2(α−2)/2 in the obnoxious UAV
placement game.
Proof. We only consider x-domain location to prove strate-
gyproofness, as y-domain can be analyzed similarly. Assume,
without loss of generality, that
∑
xi∈[0,A) wi ≤
∑
xi∈[A,2A] wi.
Thus, UAV’s x-location of Mechanism 3 is x = 0. We can see
that any user in [0, A) prefers x = 2A and any user in [A, 2A]
prefers x = 0. Any user in [A, 2A] is not willing to misreport his
x-domain location, while any user in [0, A) can not change the
relationship that
∑
xi∈[0,A) wi ≤
∑
xi∈[A,2A] wi by misreporting
his x-domain location. Thus, Mechanism 5 is strategyproof. Next,
we prove approximation ratio γ.
To obtain the approximation ratio, we need to let z0 = 0 first.
Without loss of generality, assume that∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wi >
∑
i:xi∈[A,2A]
wi,
∑
i:yi∈[0,B)
wi >
∑
i:yi∈[B,2B]
wi. (9)
The other cases can be analyzed similarly. Given condition (9),
Mechanism 3 selects that x = 2A and y = 2B. Since the optimal
solution can only select x = 0 or 2A and y = 0 or 2B, to
obtain the largest approximation ratio, the optimal solution must
7be xopt = 0 and yopt = 0. By Lemma 2, the optimal social utility
can be described as
OPT2(x, y) =
n∑
i=1
wi(x
2
i + y
2
i )
α/2
≤
n∑
i=1
wi2
α/2−1(xαi + y
α
i )
=2α/2−1(
∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wix
α
i +
∑
i:xi∈(A,2A]
wix
α
i )
2α/2−1(
∑
i:yi∈[0,B)
wiy
α
i +
∑
i:yi∈(B,2B]
wiy
α
i )
≤2α/2−1(
∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wiA
α +
∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wi(2A)
α)
+ 2α/2−1(
∑
i:yi∈[0,B)
wiB
α +
∑
i:xi∈[0,B)
wi(2B)
α)
=2α/2−1(5Aα
∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wi + 5B
α
∑
i:yi∈[0,B)
wi) (10)
Under Mechanism 3, by Lemma 1, the social utility at x = 2A
and y = 2B is
SU(f, (x, y)) =
n∑
i=1
wi((2A− xi)2 + (2B − yi)2)α/2
≥
n∑
i=1
wi((2A− xi)α + (2B − yi)α)
=
∑
i:xi∈[0,A)
wi(2A− xi)α +
∑
i:xi∈[A,2A])
wi(2A− xi)α
+
∑
i:yi∈[0,B)
wi(2B − yi)α +
∑
i:yi∈[B,2B])
wi(2B − yi)α
≥0 +
∑
i:xi∈[0,A))
wiA
α + 0 +
∑
i:yi∈[0,B))
wiB
α. (11)
To determine the maximum approximation ratio γ for the worst-
case, we want to increase the optimal social utility in (10) and
reduce the social utility of Mechanism 3 in (11). We set xi = A
for all xi ∈ [0, A) and xi = 2A for all xi ∈ [A, 2A]. by compar-
ing (10) and (11), we have OPT2,x(x) ≤ 2(α−2)/25SUx(f, x).
Hence, we conclude γ ≤ 5× 2(α−2)/2 for Mechanism 3.
Mechanism 4. The UAV strategically decides its location f =
(x, y, z0), where
x =
{
0, if
∑
i:xi∈[0,A) 1 ≤
∑
i:xi∈[A,2A] 1;
2A, otherwise,
y =
{
0, if
∑
i:yi∈[0,B) 1 ≤
∑
i:yi∈[B,2B] 1;
2B, otherwise,
Mechanism 4 is a strategyproof mechanism with approxima-
tion ratio γ = 5wmaxwmin 2
(α−2)/2 in the obnoxious UAV placement
game. Mechanism 4 treats each user equally and does not consider
users’ weights. Since the UAV does not need to gather the
information of weights from users, it is strategyproof even if we
allow users to misreport their weights.
4.2 Empirical analysis of Mechanism 3
In this subsection, we present empirical analysis to evaluate the
average performances of Mechanism 3 given α = 2. We have
SU(f, (x, y)) =
∑n
i=1 wi((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20). We
split social utility as SU = SUx + SUy +
∑n
i=1 wiz
2
0 . By using
weighted mean x¯ in (4), we rewrite the social utility (3) in x-
domain as
SUx(f, x) =
n∑
i=1
wi((xi − x¯) + (x¯− x))2
=
n∑
i=1
wi((xi − x¯)2 + (x¯− x)2) + 2(x¯− x)
n∑
i=1
wi(xi − x¯),
where the last summation term is zero due to (4). Thus, we can
rewrite SUx(f, x) = (x − x¯)2
∑n
i=1 wi +
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − x¯)2.
Similarly, we can obtain SUy and finally SU as
SU(f, (x, y)) = ((x− x¯)2 + (y − y¯)2)
n∑
i=1
wi
+
n∑
i=1
wi((xi − x¯)2 + (yi − y¯)2 + z20).
We can see that SU(f, (x, y)) is linear with the square of the
distance between (x, y) and (x¯, y¯). Obviously, we obtain the
optimal UAV location as
xopt =
{
0, if x¯ ≥ A;
2A, if x¯ < A, yopt =
{
0, if y¯ ≥ B;
2B, if y¯ < B. (12)
Theorem 5. Given α = 2, as the number n of users goes
to infinity, the probability that UAV location (x, y, z0) under
Mechanism 3 equals the social optimal location goes to 1, given
all xi’s, yi’s and wi’s are independent and identically distributed,
respectively, and all xi’s, and yi’s follow any continuous asym-
metric distributions (including Beta distribution and skew normal
distribution), respectively.
Proof. We only consider x-domain location analysis due to sym-
metry. Compared with xopt in (12), Mechanism 3 in x-domain
can be rewritten as:
x =
{
0, if xwmed ≥ A;
2A, otherwise.
In the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix. we have proved that x¯
converges in probability towards the expectation of x1 (i.e., x¯
P→
IE[x1], as n → ∞) and xwmed converges in probability towards
the median of x1 (i.e., xwmed
P→ H−1( 12 ), as n → ∞). Since
all xi’s follow continuous asymmetric distribution, respectively,
mean of xi’s and median of xi’s lie in either [0, A) or [A, 2A]
simultaneously. Without loss of generality, we consider that they
all lie in interval [0, A). Considering the optimal UAV location, we
have IE[x1] ∈ [0, A) and thus x¯
P∈[0, A), as n→∞. According to
(12), the optimal UAV location satisfies xopt
P→ 2A, as n → ∞.
Considering UAV location in Mechanism 3, we have H−1( 12 )
∈ [0, A) and thus xwmed
P∈[0, A), as n → ∞. According to
Mechanism 3, the optimal UAV location is that x P→ 2A, as n→
∞. Therefore, as n→∞, Pr[x = xopt]→1 in Mechanism 3.
Comparing Theorems 3 and 5, we can see that Theorem 3
needs the symmetric location distribution condition for type 1
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Fig. 3: Skewness of two asymmetric random distributions of users’
locations, and Mechanism 3’s convergence rate to the optimal
placement under the two distributions and user number n.
users, which makes sure the UAV location in Mechanisms 1
and 2 can approach the optimal point. While Theorem 5 needs
asymmetric location distribution condition for type 2 users, which
makes sure the UAV location in both Mechanism 3 and the optimal
point can diverge in the same direction towards the same corner.
We provide empirical simulations in Fig.3 for Mechanism 3
when n is finite. For simplicity, we assume I3 = [0, 1]3, each
user’s location follows asymmetric Beta distribution in I3 and
every wi follows the continuous uniform distribution in [0, 1].
We have two user groups’ location distributions for simulation
comparisons. We can see from Fig.3(a) that random distribution
Beta(2,5) has larger skewness and is more asymmetric than
Beta(2,3), and thus provides faster convergence rate for Mecha-
nism 3 towards the social optimum, as observed from Fig.3(b).
This is consistent with Theorem 5. Intuitively, a larger skewness
of users’ distribution implies a higher probability for UAV location
of Mechanism 3 to be equal to the optimal UAV location.
Fig.3(c) shows that the mean social utility of Mechanism 3
versus the mean optimal social utility under distributions Beta(2,5)
and Beta(2,3). The mean social utility achieved by our Mechanism
3 and the mean optimal social utility under both Beta(2,5) and
Beta(2,3) increase linearly as the number of users increases. No
matter which number of users we are looking at, the performance
gap between the mean social utility achieved by Mechanism 3
and the mean optimal social utility is quite small, telling that our
Mechanism 3 approximates the optimal solution well in average
sense.
5 DUAL-PREFERENCE UAV PLACEMENT GAME
FOR BOTH TYPES OF USERS
In this section, we design a strategyproof mechanism in the dual-
preference UAV placement game where both types of users co-
exist. Without loss of generality, we assume all users’ weights as 1,
i.e., wi = 1 for any i ∈ N , and our results (though more involved)
can also be extended to the weighted case in any distributions.
As shown in Fig.1, each user has his own preference type and
we define user i’s type as θi which is either 1 or 2. A user i
with θi = 1 (facility user) prefers to be close to the UAV and a
user i with θi = 2 (adverse user) prefers to be far away from the
UAV. We denote Θ = {θ1, . . . , θn} as the profile of all n users’
preferences. Now the UAV needs to gather information of users’
preference types besides users’ locations to determine (x, y, z0).
Note that a user may also cheat on his report of preference type,
and this adds difficulty to the UAV’s strategyproof mechanism
design. Given the location of the UAV (x, y, z0), we define a user
i’s utility as
ui((x, y, z0), (xi, yi, θi))
=

((2A)2 − (xi − x)2 + (2B)2 − (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2,
if θi = 1;
((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + z20)α/2, if θi = 2.
Note that we want to minimize the service cost for a type 1 user
(facility user) as in Section 3, which is equivalent to maximizing
the user’s utility−(xi−x)2−(yi−y)2. To make our definition of
approximation ratio meaningful, we require nonnegative utilities
and add (2A)2 + (2B)2 to the utility. This technique is widely
used (e.g., [17]) and does not change our main results.
Definition 3. A mechanism is strategyproof in the dual-preference
UAV placement game if no user can benefit from misreporting
9his location and preference type. Formally, given location profile
Ω = (< xi, x−i >,< yi, y−i >) ∈ I2n, preference profile Θ,
and any misreported location (x′i, y
′
i) ∈ I2 and preference type
θ′i for user i ∈ N , it holds that
ui(f((xi, yi, θi), (x−i, y−i,Θ−i)), (xi, yi, θi))
≥ui(f((x′i, y′i, θ′i), (x−i, y−i,Θ−i)), (xi, yi, θi)).
Given a location profile Ω, let OPT3(x, y,Θ) be the optimal
social utility in this game. A strategyproof mechanism f has an
approximation ratio γ ≥ 1, if for any location profile (x, y,Θ)
and Θ, OPT3(x, y,Θ) ≤ γSU(f, (x, y,Θ)).
The objective of this game is to maxx,y
∑n
i=1 ui((x, y, z0),
(xi, yi, θi)).We can see that the social utility function is quadratic
and it is not difficult to derive the optimal UAV location by
checking the first-order condition. However, outputting the opti-
mal location is not a strategyproof mechanism and we needs to
design a stragetyproof mechanism.
5.1 Design and analysis of strategyproof mechanism
Mechanism 5. Consider x-domain and define two user sets for
each preference type:
R1 = {i : θi = 1, xi ≥ A}, R2 = {i : θi = 2, xi > A},
L1 = {i : θi = 1, xi < A}, L2 = {i : θi = 2, xi ≤ A}.
The x-location of the UAV is x = 2A if |R1|+|L2| ≥ |R2|+|L1|
and x = 0 otherwise. Consider y-domain and define two user sets
for each preference type:
R¯1 = {i : θi = 1, yi ≥ B}, R¯2 = {i : θi = 2, yi > B},
L¯1 = {i : θi = 1, yi < B}, L¯2 = {i : θi = 2, yi ≤ B}.
The y-location of the UAV is y = 2B if |R¯1|+ |L¯2| ≥ |R¯2|+ |L¯1|
and y = 0 otherwise.
In Mechanism 5, users in sets R1 and L2 prefer the UAV to
locate at x = 2A, while the other users prefer the UAV to locate
at x = 0. We follow the majority rule to design Mechanism 5.
Actually, Mechanism 5 for the dual-preference UAV placement
game is inspired by Mechanism 3 for the obnoxious UAV place-
ment game, yet this new mechanism further considers that users
may also cheat on their preference types besides locations.
Theorem 6. Mechanism 5 is a stragegyproof mechanism with
approximation ratio γ = 23α/2.
Proof. We first prove the strategyproofness. We only consider x-
domain, as y-domains can be analyzed similarly. Assume, without
loss of generality, that |R1|+ |L2| < |R2|+ |L1|. UAV location
of Mechanism 5 is x = 0. We can see that any user in R1 ∪ L2
prefers x = 2A and any user in R2 ∪L1 prefers x = 0. Any user
in R2 ∪ L1 has no incentive to misreport his x-domain location
and preference type, and any user in R1 ∪ L2 can not change
the relationship that |R1| + |L2| < |R2| + |L1| by misreporting
his x-domain location or preference type. Thus, Mechanism 5 is
strategyproof. Next, we prove the approximation ratio.
Assume, without loss of generality, that |R1|+ |L2| < |R2|+
|L1| and |R¯1|+ |L¯2| < |R¯2|+ |L¯1|. UAV location of Mechanism
5 is x = 0 and y = 0. To obtain the approximation ratio, we
should let z0 = 0 first. By Lemma 2, the optimal utility can be
described as
OPT3(x, y)
= max
x,y
(
∑
i:θi=1
((2A)2 − (xi − x)2 + (2B)2 − (yi − y)2)α/2
+
∑
i:θi=2
((xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2)α/2)
≤2α−22 max
x,y
(
∑
i:θi=1
((2A)2 − (xi − x)2)α2 + ((2B)2
− (yi − y)2)α2 ) +
∑
i:θi=2
((xi − x)α + (yi − y)α))
=OPT3,x +OPT3,y, (13)
where OPT3,x = 2
α−2
2 maxx(
∑
i:θi=1
((2A)2 −
(xi − x)2)α2 +
∑
i:θi=2
(xi − x)α) and OPT3,y =
2
α−2
2 maxy(
∑
i:θi=1
((2B)2−(yi−y)2)α2 +
∑
i:θi=2
(yi−y)α).
By Lemma 1, the social utility in Mechanism 5 is
SU(f, (x, y))
=
∑
i:θi=1
((2A)2 − x2i + (2B)2 − y2i )α/2 +
∑
i:θi=2
(x2i + y
2
i )
α/2
≥
∑
i:θi=1
(((2A)2 − x2i )
α
2 + ((2B)2 − y2i )
α
2 ) +
∑
i:θi=2
(xαi + y
α
i )
=SUx + SUy, (14)
where SUx =
∑
i:θi=1
((2A)2−x2i )
α
2 +
∑
i:θi=2
xαi and SUy =∑
i:θi=1
((2B)2−y2i )
α
2 +
∑
i:θi=2
yαi . We consider the case that
x ∈ [0, A] for the optimal UAV location. By checking the value
ranges of xi and x, OPT3,x satisfies that
2−
α−2
2 OPT3,x = max
x
(
∑
i:i∈R1∪L1
((2A)2 − (xi − x)2)α2
+
∑
i:i∈R2∪L2
(xi − x)α)
≤
∑
i:i∈R2
(2A)α +
∑
i:i∈L2
Aα +
∑
i:i∈L1
(2A)α +
∑
i:i∈R1
(2A)α
=|R2|(2A)α + |L2|Aα + |L1|(2A)α + |R1|(2A)α
=(|R2|(2A)α + |L1|(2A)α) + (|L2|Aα + |R1|(2A)α)
≤(|R2|(2A)α + |L1|(2A)α) + (|L2|(2A)α + |R1|(2A)α)
≤(|R2|(2A)α + |L1|(2A)α) + (|R2|(2A)α + |L1|(2A)α)
=2|R2|(2A)α + 2|L1|(2A)α. (15)
Then we consider the other case that x ∈ (A, 2A]. By checking
the value ranges of xi and x, OPT3,x satisfies that
2−
α−2
2 OPT3,x
≤
∑
i:i∈R2
Aα +
∑
i:i∈L2
(2A)α +
∑
i:i∈L1
(2A)α +
∑
i:i∈R1
(2A)α
=|R2|Aα + |L2|(2A)α + |L1|(2A)α + |R1|(2A)α
=(|R2|Aα + |L1|(2A)α) + (|L2|(2A)α + |R1|(2A)α)
≤(|R2|Aα + |L1|(2A)α) + (|L1|(2A)α + |R2|(2A)α)
=|R2|(Aα + (2A)α) + 2|L1|(2A)α. (16)
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Fig. 4: Mechanism 5’s convergence to the optimal placement under
two different asymmetric distribution of users’ locations and two
different n2/n1 value of Mechanism 5 versus convergence rate to
the optimal placement.
For SUx, we have
SUx =
∑
i:i∈R1∪L1
((2A)2 − x2i )
α
2 +
∑
i:i∈R2∪L2
xαi
≥
∑
i∈R2
Aα + 0 +
∑
i∈L1
(4A2 −A2)α2 + 0
=|R2|Aα + 3α2 |L1|Aα. (17)
Therefore, the approximation ratio is
γ =
OPT3(x, y)
SU(f, (x, y))
≤ OPT3,x +OPT3,y
SUx + SUy
=
OPT3,x
SUx
≤2α−22 2|R2|(2A)
α + 2|L1|(2A)α
|R2|Aα + 3α2 |L1|Aα
≤ 23α/2, (18)
where the first inequality is due to (13) and (14), and the second
inequality is due to (15), (16) and (17).
5.2 Empirical analysis of Mechanism 5
In this subsection, we present empirical analysis to evaluate the
average performances of Mechanism 5 for α = 2. Define n1 =
|{i : θi = 1}|, n2 = |{i : θi = 2}| with n1 + n2 = n.
We provide empirical simulations in Fig.4 for Mechanism 5
when n is finite. For simplicity, we assume I2 = [0, 1]2, each
user’s location follows asymmetric Beta distribution in I2 and
n2/n1 is greater than 1. We have four curves in the simulations
for comparisons. In Curves 1 and 2, n2/n1 = 1.5, and in Curves 3
and 4, n2/n1 = 4 with more type 2 users given the same number
of total users. In Curves 1 and 3, each user’s location follows
Beta(2,3), and in Curves 2 and 4, each user’s location follows
more asymmetric distribution Beta(2,5) in Fig.3(a).
We can see in Fig.4 that, distribution Beta(2,5) provides faster
convergence rate for Mechanism 5 to approach 1 (social optimum)
by comparing Curves 1 and 2 (or Curves 3 and 4). Intuitively, a
larger skewness of users’ distribution tells a higher probability
of UAV location under Mechanism 5 equal to the optimal UAV
location. By comparing Curves 1 and 3 (or Curves 2 and 4), we
can see that the higher value of n2/n1 with more type 2 users
provides faster convergence rate for Mechanism 5 to approach
the social optimum. As shown in Fig.3(c), we have shown that
Mechanism 3 already approximates the optimal solution so we
omit showing the similar figure with benchmarks here.
6 EXTENSIONS TO MULTI-UAV PLACEMENT
In previous sections, we limit our design to a single UAV’s
deployment. In this section, we extend the mechanism design of
the three placement games by considering multiple cooperative
UAVs. For simplification, we only consider α = 2. We first study
the dual-preference placement game for two UAVs, and then study
the rest two one-preference games for an arbitrary number k of
UAVs.
6.1 The placement game with two dual-preference
UAVs
In this subsection, we design a strategyproof mechanism for the
two-UAV location game with dual-preference for α = 2. Though
we only have two UAVs here, we allow the general type setting,
where each user has his own preference towards one out of the
two different UAVs and a user’s preferences over the two UAVs
may not be the same. Technically, it is difficult to tackle this more
general case with more than one UAV as each user may have
diverse and hidden preferences over different UAVs. We define
preference of user i to UAV j as θji which is either 1 or 2 and
user i may not truthfully report his preferences. Any user i with
θji = 1 prefers to be close to UAV j and any user i with θ
j
i = 2
prefers to be far away from UAV j, where j = 1, 2. We denote
Θ = {(θ11, θ21), (θ12, θ22), . . . , (θ1n, θ2n)} as the profile of all n
users’ preferences. The UAVs need to gather information of both
users’ locations (x, y) and preferences Θ to jointly determine their
locations (X1, Y1, Z1) and (X2, Y2, Z2). Given the locations
of the two UAVs ((X1, Y1, Z1), (X2, Y2, Z2)) = f(x, y,Θ),
similar to Section 5, we define user i’s utility towards UAV j
as
uji =

(2A)2 − (Xj − xi)2 + (2B)2
−(Yj − yi)2, if θji = 1;
(Xj − xi)2 + (Yj − yi)2 + Z2j , if θji = 2.
(19)
The user i’s utility is ui = u1i + u
2
i . The social utility of
a mechanism f is defined as: SU(f((x, y),Θ), ((x, y),Θ)) =∑n
i=1 ui(f((x, y),Θ), xi, θi). We still use OPT3((x, y),Θ) to
denote the optimal solution of maximizing SU .
We say a mechanism f has an approximation ratio γ, if for
any profile (x, y) ∈ I3n and Θ ∈ {1, 2}2n, OPT3((x, y),Θ) ≤
γSU(f, (x, y),Θ). To maximize SU and obtain the optimal
solution OPT is difficult, since SU is neither convex nor concave
now. This is different from Section 5 for a single UAV case and
adds difficulty to mechanism design. Still, we can show that the
optimal solution is not strategyproof since this dual-preference
game’s special case is the obnoxious UAV placement game.
By considering n users’ different x-domain locations and
mixed preferences towards the two UAVs, we define eight sets
of users as shown in Table 1 with Q1 ∪Q2 · · · ∪Q8 = N :
Set of users {θ
1
i , θ
2
i } ={1,1} {1,2} {2,1} {2,2}
xi ∈ [0, A] Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4(A, 2A] Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
TABLE 1: Sets of users Q1 −Q8.
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We rewrite social utility as SU = SUx +SUy +SUz , where
SUx(f(x,Θ), (x,Θ)) is as follows based on (19) and Table 1:
SUx(f(x,Θ), (x,Θ)) =
n∑
i=1
(u1i,x + u
2
i,x)
=
∑
i∈Q1∪Q5
(8A2 − (X1 − xi)2 − (X2 − xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q2∪Q6
(4A2 − (X1 − xi)2 + (X2 − xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q3∪Q7
((X1 − xi)2 + 4A2 − (X2 − xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q4∪Q8
((X1 − xi)2 + (X2 − xi)2). (20)
Next, we present our mechanism for the two UAVs.
Mechanism 6. If |Q2|+|Q7| ≥ |Q3|+|Q6|, the two UAVs locate
their x-domain locations to (X1, X2) = (0, 2A); Otherwise,
(X1, X2) = (2A, 0). (Y1, Y2) in the y-domain follows the same
placement strategy, respectively.
Theorem 7. Mechanism 6 is strategyproof with approximation
ratio γ = 4.
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix. If there are k >
2 UAVs in the dual-preference placement game, the mechanism
design and analysis will be more involved by including 2k+1 user
sets and are left for future study. Now, we only have 8 user sets
Q1 − Q8 for k = 2. Next, we focus on mechanism design for
one-preference k-UAV placement games.
6.2 The obnoxious and favorable k-UAV placement
game
We now study the obnoxious multi-UAV placement game for α =
2. There are k ≥ 2 obnoxious UAVs, where each user of type 2
wants to maximize his utility to keep away from the UAVs. The
location of the j-th UAV is (Xj , Yj , Zj) with j = 1, 2, . . . , k.
Since each user i wants to reduce the total interference from all
the UAVs, the utility of user i should be the total utility of user i
given k UAVs’ locations, i.e.,
ui(f(x, y), (xi, yi)) =
k∑
j=1
wi((xi −Xj)2 + (yi − Yj)2 + Z2j ).
Similar to one obnoxious UAV placement game in Section 4, the
social utility is the total utility of n users and k UAVs cooperate
to maximize the social utility by jointly choosing their locations.
The optimal solution is not strategyproof as the optimal solution
with one obnoxious UAV is not strategyproof as shown in Section
4. Our objective is to design a strategyproof mechanism with a
small approximation ratio.
Mechanism 7. Given any location profile (x, y) ∈ I2n, if k is
even, the locations of k UAVs are (Xj , Yj , Zj) = (0, 0, Zj)
with j = 1, 2, . . . , k2 , and (Xj , Yj , Zj) = (2A, 2B,Zj) with
j = k2 + 1, . . . , k; if k is odd, the locations of k UAVs
are (Xj , Yj , Zj) = (0, 0, Zj) with j = 1, 2, . . . , k+12 , and
(Xj , Yj , Zj) = (2A, 2B,Zj) with j = k+12 + 1, . . . , k.
Theorem 8. Mechanism 7 is a stragegyproof mechanism with
approximation ratio
γ =
{
2, if k is even;
2k
k−1 , if k is odd.
Proof. In x-, and y-domains, the UAVs are located at the end-
points of each domain. Mechanism 7 is strategyproof since the
locations of UAVs are fixed and are independent of users’ reports.
We next prove approximation ratio γ. Due to the symmetry in
every domain, we only need to consider x-domain. Define the
number of UAVs deployed at 0 in x-domain as k1, and the number
of UAVs deployed at 2A as k2 with k1 + k2 = k. According to
Mechanism 7, k1 = k2 = k2 if k is even, and k1 =
k+1
2 and
k2 =
k−1
2 if k is odd. Note that the optimal social utility is the
maximum of SUx =
∑k
j=1
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − Xj)2, by choosing
X1, · · · , Xk jointly, and the approximation ratio is
γ =
maxX1,...,Xk
∑k
j=1
∑n
i=1 wi(xi −Xj)2
k1
∑n
i=1 wix
2
i + k2
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − 2A)2
.
If weighted mean x¯ =
∑n
i=1 wixi∑n
i=1 wi
≥ A, we have
γ =
k
∑n
i=1 wix
2
i
k1
∑n
i=1 wix
2
i + k2
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − 2A)2
=
k
k1 + k2
∑n
i=1 wi(xi−2A)2
wix2i
≤ k
k1
.
If weighted mean x¯ =
∑n
i=1 wixi∑n
i=1 wi
< A, we have
γ =
k
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − 2A)2
k1
∑n
i=1 wix
2
i + k2
∑n
i=1 wi(xi − 2A)2
=
k
k1
wix2i∑n
i=1 wi(xi−2A)2 + k2
≤ k
k2
.
Therefore, we have
γ = max{ k
k2
,
k
k1
} =
{
2, if k is even;
2k
k−1 , if k is odd.
On the other hand, besides the obnoxious multi-UAV place-
ment game, we can also consider the multi-UAV placement game
including k ≥ 2 of favorable UAVs, where each user of type 1
wants to minimize his cost to enjoy wireless service provided by
the closest one out of k UAVs. Thus, the service cost of user i
should be
ci(f(x, y), (xi, yi)) = min
j≤k
wi((xi −Xj)2 + (yi − Yj)2 + Z2j ).
The optimal solution is not strategyproof as the optimal solution
with one favorable UAV in Section 3 is not strategyproof. We want
to design a strategyproof mechanism.
We propose the percentile mechanism for k cooperative UAVs,
which is inspired by the weighted median Mechanism 2 and paper
[19]. Denote W = w1 +w2 + · · ·+wn. Define a new sequenced
user number set Λx in x-domain,
Λx = {λx,1, λx,2, . . . , λx,W }
= {x1, . . . , x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
w1
, x2, . . . , x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
w2
, . . . , xn, . . . , xn︸ ︷︷ ︸
wn
},
where λx,1 satisfies that λx,i ≤ λx,i+1, for any i ≥ 1. Basically,
we rescale weights to be positive integers and partition each user i
of weight wi into wi users of unit weight. Denote pj =
j
k+1
with j = 1, 2, . . . , k as the percentile for k UAVs. Given a
reported location profile (x, y), our percentile mechanism locates
x-location of the j-th UAV by selecting the pj-percentile of the
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ordered projection of Λx in the x-domain as location of UAV j in
x-domain. Formally,
(X1, X2, . . . , Xk)
=(λx,b(W−1)p1c+1, λx,b(W−1)p2c+1, . . . , λx,b(W−1)pkc+1).
The locations of the j-th UAV in y- and z-domians follow the
same percentile strategy. Actually, Mechanism 2 for k = 1 UAV
can be considered as a special case of percentile mechanism with
p1 = 1/2 . We can also follow the strategyproof proof of Mecha-
nism 2 to prove that this percentile mechanism is strategyproof.
We illustrate multi-UAV placement strategy by using an
example of 14 users and 3 UAVs with each wi = 1. With
(p1, p2, p3) = (0.25, 0.5, 0.75), the percentile mechanism lo-
catesX1 for the first UAV to the x-coordinate of the fourth ordered
user’s location (due to b0.25 × (14 − 1)c + 1 = 4), X2 for the
second UAV to the x-coordinate of the seventh ordered user’s
location (due to b0.5 × (14 − 1)c + 1 = 7) and X3 for the last
UAV to the x-coordinate of the tenth ordered user’ location (due
to b0.75× (14− 1)c+ 1 = 10).
7 CONCLUSIONS
We studied the algorithmic game theory problem to determine the
final deployment location of a UAV in a 3D space, by learning
selfish users’ truthful locations and preferences. To minimize
the social cost in the UAV placement game, we designed the
strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio 2(3α−4)/2,
as compared to the social optimum with full information. We
also studied the obnoxious UAV placement game to maximize
the social utility of a group of interfered users and proposed a
strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio 5× 2(α−2)/2.
Besides the worst-case analysis, we proved that the empirical
performances of the proposed mechanisms improve with the
number of users. Moveover, we studied the dual-preference UAV
placement game for the coexistence of the two groups of users,
and proposed a strategyproof mechanism with approximation ratio
23α/2. Finally, We extended the three placement games to include
more than one UAV by designing strategyproof mechanisms and
proving their approximation ratios.
In the future, we will study the dual-preference UAV place-
ment game and consider user i can misreport his weight wi. We
will further consider randomized strategyproof mechanism designs
in the three kinds of UAV placement games.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1. If C,D ≥ 0 and E ≥ 2, (C +D)E ≥ CE +DE .
Proof.
(C +D)E ≥ CE +DE ⇔ (1 + D
C
)E ≥ 1 + (D
C
)E
⇔ (1 + t)
E
1 + tE
≥ 1 for t = D
C
. (21)
To prove (21), we denote function G(t) = (1+t)
E
1+tE
for t ≥ 0 and
E ≥ 2. We have
dG
dt
=
(1 + tE)E(1 + t)E−1 − EtE−1(1 + t)E
(1 + tE)2
= 0
⇒ tE−1 = 1⇒ t = 1.
If t ∈ [0, 1) dGdt > 0; if t ∈ (1,+∞) dGdt < 0. G(t) obtain its
minimum at t = 0 or t = +∞. G(t) ≥ min{G(0), G(∞)} = 1.
Therefore (21) is proven.
Lemma 2. If C,D ≥ 0 and E ≥ 2, (C +D)E ≤ 2E−1(CE +
DE).
Proof.
(C +D)E ≤ 2E−1(CE +DE)
⇔(1 + D
C
)E ≤ 2E−1(1 + (D
C
)E)
⇔ (1 + t)
E
1 + tE
≤ 2E−1 for t = D
C
.
By the proof of Lemma 1, G(t) obtain its maximum at t = 1 and
G(t) ≤ G(1) = 2E−1.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We first look at Mechanism 1 and have
Ratio.1 =
SCx + SCy +
∑n
i=1 wiz
2
0
OPT1,x +OPT1,y +
∑n
i=1 wiz
2
0
. (22)
Due to symmetry, we only need to consider x-domain part of
SCx
OPT1,x
in (22). For SCx in (22), we have
SCx=
n∑
i=1
wi(xi − xmed)2=
n∑
i=1
wi((xi − x¯)+(x¯− xmed))2
= (x¯− xmed)2
n∑
i=1
wi +
n∑
i=1
wi(xi − x¯)2
= (x¯− xmed)2
n∑
i=1
wi +OPT1,x. (23)
We note OPT1,x in (23) does not converge to 0, since
IE[
n∑
i=1
wi(xi − x¯)2] ≥nwminIE[(xi − IE(x1))2]
=nwminVar[x1] > 0.
To prove Ratio.1 in (22) converges in probability towards 1, we
only need to prove the first term (x¯ − xmed)2 in (23) converges
in probability to 0 as n goes to infinity, since
(x¯− xmed)2 P→ 0
⇒| SCx
OPT1,x
− 1| = (x¯− xmed)
2
∑n
i=1 wi∑n
i=1 wi(xi − x¯)2
≤ (x¯− xmed)
2nwmax
nwminVar[x1]
=
wmax
wminVar[x1]
(x¯− xmed)2 P→ 0
⇒Ratio.1 P→ 1,
as n→∞. Then we can show the followings.
Assume h and H are the probability density function and
cumulative distribution function of xi, respectively, and the range
of xi is η. Assume g andG are the probability density function and
cumulative distribution function of wi, respectively, and the range
of wi is β. Assume all variables are continuous. The expectation
of random variable x¯ is
IE[x¯] =
∫
x1∈η
· · ·
∫
xn∈η
∫
w1∈β
· · ·
∫
wn∈β∑n
i=1 wixi∑n
i=1 wi
(
n∏
j=1
h(xj)g(wj))dw1 . . . dwndx1 . . . dxn
=
∫
w1∈β
· · ·
∫
wn∈β
∑n
i=1 IE[x1]wi∑n
i=1 wi
g(w1) . . . g(wn)
dw1 . . . dwn = IE[x1]. (24)
As n→∞, due to
Var[
∑n
i=1 wixi
n
]→ 0,Var[ n∑n
i=1 wi
]→ 0,
IE[
∑n
i=1 wixi
n
]→ IE[w1]IE[x1], IE[ n∑n
i=1 wi
]→ 1
IE[w1]
,
we have the variance of x¯ is
Var[x¯] = Var[
∑n
i=1 wixi
n
n∑n
i=1 wi
]→ 0. (25)
Therefore, due to (24) and (25), as n → ∞, x¯ converges in
probability towards IE[x1], i.e.,
x¯
P→ IE[x1]. (26)
On the other hand we consider random variable xmed and
we assume n is odd. Otherwise, if n is even we can get the
same conclusion. From order statistics, we have the distribution
of xmed,
xmed(ζ) =
n!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
h(ζ)H(ζ)
n−1
2 (1−H(ζ))n−12 , ζ ∈ η.
Thus we derive the expectation of xmed,
IE[xmed]=
∫
ζ∈η
ζ
n!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
h(ζ)H(ζ)
n−1
2 (1−H(ζ))n−12 dζ
=
n!
((n−12 )!)
2
∫
ζ∈η
ζH(ζ)
n−1
2 (1−H(ζ))n−12 dH(ζ)
=
n!
((n−12 )!)
2
∫ 1
0
H−1(ψ)ψ
n−1
2 (1− ψ)n−12 dψ
=
∫ 1
0
H−1(ψ)Sn(ψ)dψ,
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where H−1(ψ) for 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is the inverse function of H(ζ)
and Sn(ψ) is a symmetric function satisfying
Sn(ψ) =
n!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
ψ
n−1
2 (1− ψ)n−12 .
Sn(ψ) reaches its maximum at ψ = 12 and by using Stirling’s
approximation , its maximum is
Sn(
1
2
) =
n!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
(
1
2
)n−1 ≈
√
2pin(ne )
n
2pi n−12 (
n−1
2
e )
n−12n−1
=
√
2pin
pie
(1 +
1
n− 1)
n →
√
2pin
pi
→∞, (27)
as n → ∞ and its value is 0 when ψ ∈ {0, 1}. By using the
property of Beta function , we have for any n,∫ 1
ψ=0
Sn(ψ) dψ =
n!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
(n−12 )!(
n−1
2 )!
n!
= 1. (28)
Thus from (27) and (28), we can see that function lim
n→∞Sn(ψ) of
ψ is Dirac delta function (see Chapter 6. Generalized Functions
in [22]). Function lim
n→∞Sn(ψ) actually is δ
1
2
(ψ). By using the
definite integral property of Dirac delta function (see Equation 6.4
in page 160 in [22]), we have
lim
n→∞ IE[xmed] = limn→∞
∫ 1
0
H−1(ψ)Sn(ψ)dψ
=
∫ 1
0
H−1(ψ)( lim
n→∞Sn(ψ))dψ
=
∫ 1
0
H−1(ψ)δ 1
2
(ψ)dψ = H−1(
1
2
). (29)
By using a similar method in (29), we derive as n → ∞, the
variance of xmed,
Var[xmed] = IE[x
2
med]− (IE[xmed])2
=
∫ 1
ψ=0
(H−1(ψ))2Sn(ψ) dψ − (IE[xmed])2
→ (H−1(1
2
))2 − (H−1(1
2
))2 = 0. (30)
Therefore, due to (29) and (30), as n→∞,
xmed
P→ H−1(1
2
). (31)
Since all xi follow symmetric distribution, it holds that
IE[x1] = H
−1( 12 ), which means the mean of xi is equal to the
median of xi. Due to (26), (31) and
|x¯− xmed| ≤ |x¯− IE[x1]|+ |xmed −H−1(1
2
)|,
we have proved |x¯ − xmed| P→ 0, as n → ∞. By checking (23),
we have SCxOPT1,x
P→ 1, as n → ∞. Therefore Ratio.1 P→ 1,
Similarly, we can prove Ratio.2 of Mechanism 2 converges in
probability towards 1, as n→∞.
Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. First, we prove Mechanism 6 is strategyproof. In Mecha-
nism 6, there are only two choices for the two UAVs’ x-locations:
(0, 2A) and (2A, 0). By comparing the utility of user i in eight
different sets Q1, · · · , Q8 for points (0, 2A) and (2A, 0), we can
obtain user i’s preference towards candidates (0, 2A) and (2A, 0).
Any user i in Q2 ∪ Q7 prefers the locations of two UAVs to be
(0, 2A) and any user i in Q3 ∪ Q6 prefers the locations of two
UAVs to be (2A, 0). Any user i in Q1 ∪ Q4 ∪ Q5 ∪ Q8 are
indifferent.
Assume, without loss of generality, that |Q2|+ |Q7| ≥ |Q3|+
|Q6|. (X1, X2) in Mechanism 6 should be (0, 2A). Any user i
in Q2 ∪ Q7 is not willing to misreport his location xi or his
preference (θ1i , θ
2
i ), since (X1, X2) = (0, 2A) is already the best
choice for him. Misreporting location xi and preference (θ1i , θ
2
i )
by any user i in Q3 ∪ Q6 does not change the fact that |Q2| +
|Q7| ≥ |Q3|+ |Q6| and (X1, X2) is still (0, 2A). Any user i in
Q1∪Q4∪Q5∪Q8 has no incentive to change his location xi or his
preference (θ1i , θ
2
i ), since (X1, X2) = (0, 2A) or (X1, X2) =
(2A, 0) are the same for him.
For the other case |Q2| + |Q7| < |Q3| + |Q6|, the same
conclusion can be drawn. Therefore, misreporting location xi
and preference (θ1i , θ
2
i ) by any user i does not increase his
utility ui and Mechanism 6 is strategyproof in the x-domain. The
strategyproof result can be similarly proved for the y-domain and
z-domain.
Next, we prove approximation ratio γ. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that |Q2| + |Q7| ≥ |Q3| + |Q6| and thus
(X1, X2) = (0, 2A) for x-domain in this mechanism. For the
optimal utility, due to |Q2|+ |Q7| ≥ |Q3|+ |Q6|, we have
OPT3,x = max
(X1,X2)
∑
i∈N
((X1 − xi)2 + (X2 − xi)2)
≤n× ((2A)2 + (2A)2) = 8A2n = 8A2
8∑
i=1
|Qi|
≤8A2(|Q1|+ |Q4|+ |Q5|+ |Q8|) + 16A2(|Q2|+ |Q7|).
(32)
For the social utility of Mechanism 6, by (20), we have
SUx(0, 1) =
∑
i∈Q4∪Q8
(x2i + (2A− xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q1∪Q5
(8A2 − x2i − (2A− xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q2∪Q6
((2A)2 − x2i + (2A− xi)2)
+
∑
i∈Q3∪Q7
(x2i + (2A)
2 − (2A− xi)2)
≥2A2(|Q4|+ |Q8|) + 4A2(|Q1|+ |Q5|) + (2A)2|Q2|
+ 0× |Q6|+ 0× |Q3|+ (2A)2 × |Q7|
≥2A2(|Q4|+ |Q8|+ |Q1|+ |Q5|) + 4A2(|Q2|+ |Q7|).
(33)
By (32) and (33), we have the approximation ratio, γ =
OPT3,x
SUx(0,2A)
≤ 4.
